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1. INTRODUCTION
Following up on a previous piece describing the limiting effect of confining
federal habeas relief to violations of "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court," this brief essay focuses on a particular set of cases to examine further
the constraints the Court has placed on the grant of relief to state prisoners. Over the past
seven terms (October, 2009 to June, 2015), the Court has issued summary, per curiam
reversal of grants of federal habeas corpus relief by circuit courts of appeals at the behest
of wardens, without briefing or oral argument, in eighteen cases, including seven
involving death sentences.2 By contrast, in only five cases did the Court reverse denials of
habeas relief per curiam, and those cases presented highly unusual circumstances.3
Shining a bright light on cases in which the Court saw fit to undo a determination by a
federal court of appeals that a state prisoner had been deprived of his constitutional rights
reveals the extent to which the Great Writ has been diminished by the Court's restrictive
reading of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). State
prisoners are entitled to relief from federal courts, it appears, only for the most blatant
violations of their rights - they must be content with Constitution lite.4
The summary reversals of cases in which a panel of one of the circuit courts of
appeal, the courts directly below the Supreme Court, found merit in petitioners' claims
continue the trend of interpreting AEDPA in a way that makes it virtually impossible to
overcome the deference now due to state court rejections of constitutional claims. To
understand the dramatic changes wrought by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
AEDPA, it is useful to recall the position of state prisoners seeking redress of their
constitutional rights before that statute was enacted. Petitioners who had followed the
proper procedures (giving state courts opportunity to rule on their federal claims, not
procedurally defaulting them, and overcoming any harmless error argument) had the right
to have a federal court decide, viewing the question de novo, whether their constitutional
rights were violated in the state court proceedings. Now, state prisoners have only two
ways of securing de novo federal court review of federal constitutional claims alleged to
have been wrongly decided by the state court: through a grant of certiorari on direct
review (with the Court hearing about 75 cases per year of more than 7,000 petitions filed)
or by overcoming a finding of procedural default.6
' See Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings ofSupreme Court Precedents, 14
LEWIS & CLARKL. REV. 741, 743-44 (2010).
2 See infra Appendix A (listing cases reversing grants of habeas relief).
See infra Appendix B (listing cases reversing denials of relief); see also infra notes 159-64.
4 While this essay does not directly engage with the ongoing debate about the role of federal habeas review
prompted by Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann's book HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES,
ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011), the reader will correctly infer that the author's
sympathies lie with those who, unlike King and Hoffmann, still see a significant role for federal courts in
ensuring the protection of constitutional rights in state courts. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 198-99 (2012).
See, e.g., Brownv. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 462-64 (1953).
6 When a state court relies on an independent and adequate state ground, such as failure to raise appropriate
objections, to deny relief on a constitutional claim, rather than addressing the merits, federal courts that find
either "cause and prejudice" for the default or a showing of actual innocence may address the issue of whether
the petitioner's rights were violated de novo. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); see also Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 495-96 (1986). One scholar views that potential avenue for relief as showing that the
Court has a logical approach to the habeas remedy consistent with notions of fault comparable to those applied to
constitutional torts. See Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523, 585 (2014).
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In all other cases, federal courts, rather than granting relief to defendants who
suffered a constitutional violation that prejudiced them, instead are limited to deciding
whether the state courts' refusal to acknowledge the constitutional violation represented
such an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law that no rational
jurist would agree with the state court.7 The extent to which Congress actually intended,
when it enacted AEDPA, to cause such a dramatic shift in habeas jurisprudence is subject
to debate." Even assuming the legitimacy of the new regime, the way the Supreme Court
has handled cases in which circuit courts granted relief to state prisoners should raise
concerns about the diminished protection of constitutional rights.
The cases examined for this essay demonstrate the Court's continuing substantive
restrictions on the federal habeas remedy for state prisoners, as well as displaying its low
regard for that remedy by the use of summary procedure and a highly dismissive tone.
First, the Court's definition of what law it has "clearly established" is disconcertingly
narrow, requiring that the Supreme Court confronted on a prior occasion, in which it had
granted its notoriously parsimonious certiorari review on direct appeal, essentially the
same set of facts presented by the habeas petitioner. Second, building on its increasing
deference to any determinations by state courts on the merits of the constitutional claims,
the Court appears to require such a determination to be basically irrational to warrant
federal relief - if any "fairminded jurist"9 could arrive at the same conclusion, habeas is
precluded.
In terms of process, the Court issues these reversals without so much as hearing
the respondent - the habeas petitioner who prevailed in the Court of Appeals - on the
merits of why the grant of relief should be affirmed. On petitions by wardens, to which
prisoners respond only to urge the Court not to grant review, the Court is summarily
reversing decisions on the basis that those decisions were so clearly in error as to occasion
no debate, even when dissenting justices disagree. In addition, the per curiam opinions are
written in a tone more appropriate to scold a naughty child than to address an institution
one step below the Supreme Court. The language in the opinions in some of these cases
reflects a disdain not only of the petitioners, but of the courts of appeals that granted their
petitions, hardly in keeping with the significant constitutional rights at stake. Finally, the
few cases in which the Court uses summary reversal when habeas relief was denied
display a quite different pattern.
II. CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW
The Supreme Court has continued its pattern, first announced in Carey v.
Musladin, of narrowly defining what law has been so "clearly established" as to warrant
See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-02 (2011).
See Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act's Restrictions on Habeas Corpus are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 55, 55-56
(2013); see also Elizabeth J. Barnett, Comment,A Great Writ Reduced: Why the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of
Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Precedent Portends Defeat for State Prisoners Seeking Federal
Habeas Corpus Relief 58 OKLA. L. REv. 469, 475-78 (2005); see also Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A Decade of
Reversal: The Ninth Circuit's Record in the Supreme Court through October Term 2010, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 2165, 2175 (2012); see also Daniel J. O'Brien, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Heeding
Congress's Message: The United States Supreme Court Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief
Against All but Irrational State Court Decisions, and Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 320 (2012).
The authors of the latter two articles, a judge and assistant attorney general respectively, assume, without
explanation, that it was Congress, rather than the Court, that intended the new meaning of "unreasonable."
9 See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101-02.
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habeas relief after a state court has denied the federal constitutional claim on the merits.10
Two consequences, both harmful to the protection of constitutional rights, flow from this
approach. First, interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution designed to ensure the
fairness of criminal convictions and sentences is placed entirely in the hands of the
Supreme Court, with the lower federal courts playing virtually no role. Given the Court's
limited review of cases on certiorari review of direct appeals, the opportunity to clarify or
expand constitutional protections is vanishingly small. Second, failure to apply the
constitutional principles developed in the context of appellate review to defendants, who
may well have raised those challenges on direct appeal, but whose petitions for writ of
certiorari were (as most are) denied, results in a stark differentiation, sometimes literally
involving life or death, between prisoners whose cases are identical except for the timing
of the Supreme Court's recognition of the constitutional violation. True, that difference
has long been accepted as the price to pay in postconviction proceedings out of concern
for finality and comity,1 but when the petitioner unsuccessfully raised the claim on direct
review, the result seems particularly unfair. Moreover, using the mechanism of summary
reversal, without briefing or oral argument, for making that critical decision suggests that
the cost is disproportionate to any possible benefit achieved.
One of the Court's most recent cases emphasizing the requirement that habeas
relief is precluded in the absence of its own clearly established law illustrates the problem.
In White v. Woodall,12 over three dissents, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of
habeas relief to a Kentucky petitioner who had pled guilty to capital murder, kidnapping,
and rape and been sentenced to death. 13 The court of appeals had concluded that the trial
judge's failure, upon request, to give the jury a no-adverse-inference instruction from the
defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase (here, the only phase) of his trial violated
law that had been clearly established in a series of Supreme Court precedents.14 When the
defendant had raised this federal constitutional issue on direct appeal, the Kentucky
Supreme Court rejected it,15 and the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari.1 6
That denial, one of almost 2,000 issued that day,17 turned out to have sealed the
defendant's fate under the Court's current regime governing habeas review. Had the Court
granted certiorari, it might well have determined that the trial court did indeed violate the
defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment by refusing to issue a no-adverse-inference
instruction. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court denying relief to Mr. Woodall
acknowledged as much: "Perhaps the logical next step from [the Supreme Court
precedents] would be to hold that the Fifth Amendment requires a penalty-phase no-
adverse-inference instruction in a case like this one; perhaps not... . The appropriate time
See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 72, 74, 76-77 (2006).
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-09 (1989).
12 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014).
13 Id. at 1701, 1707 (containing a dissent written by Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor).
14 Woodall v. Simpson, 685 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 .
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court had unreasonably rejected the defendant's Fifth
Amendment claim based on clearly established law set forth in three Supreme Court cases. Id. In Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981), the Court held that a defendant is entitled to a "no adverse inference"
instruction during the guilt phase of a trial. This Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was
extended from the guilt phase to the penalty phase of a capital trial in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63
(1981). Finally, the Court determined that the "rule against negative inferences at a criminal trial appl[ies] with
equal force at sentencing[,]" even where a defendant pled guilty. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 317,
329 (1999).
" Woodallv. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 104, 115 (Ky. 2001) (distinguishing each of the Supreme Court cases
on its facts).
Woodall v. Kentucky, 537 U.S. 835 (2002).
1 See 537 U.S. 812-945 (2002) (listing the cert. petitions denied on October 7, 2002).
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to consider the question as a matter of first impression would be on direct review, not in a
habeas case governed by Sec. 2254(d)(1)."8
The Court in no way acknowledged that at the "appropriate time," the Court had
denied review,19 as it does in all but a minuscule number of cases in which certiorari is
sought on direct appeal. The Court thereby summarily relegated the defendant to
"Constitution lite," the watered-down version of constitutional protections available to
state prisoners on federal habeas review. As long as the specific facts of a petitioner's case
are, in the eyes of a majority of the Supreme Court, sufficiently different from the
precedent cases so that the "clearly established law" does not encompass them, no habeas
relief is permitted. Even if some of the justices on the Court (three, in Woodall's case)
agree with the circuit court that Supreme Court precedents had clearly established the
constitutional principle on which the petitioner relies, the state prisoner is without a
remedy for its violation, and his execution can be carried out.20
In addition to characterizing the holdings of Supreme Court cases quite narrowly,
the Court in Woodall foreclosed a basis for federal habeas relief that had been assumed to
be available since Section 2254 was first interpreted in Williams v. Taylor.21 Justice
O'Connor had included among possible "unreasonable application" scenarios one in
which "the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to
a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to
a new context where it should apply."2 2 The Court now rejected that possibility, asserting
that the "unreasonable-refusal-to-extend rule" had never been endorsed by a majority of
23the Court. The Court acknowledged that it is not always clear whether one is applying a
rule or extending it, and that § 2254 does not require an identical fact pattern for a rule to
be applied, rather than extended. Yet for relief to be available under the unreasonable
application clause, a clearly established rule must so obviously apply to the given set of
facts "that there could be no fairminded disagreement on the question."24
Finally, the Court noted in this case, as it has in several of the recent per curiam
reversals, that habeas relief can never be justified by reference to a circuit court's own
precedents. Use of lower court cases as part of what law has been "clearly established" is,
of course, expressly prohibited by the language of § 2254(d)(1) ("clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). Yet even if
circuit courts may not extend the reach of Supreme Court precedents in the habeas
context, are they precluded from looking to their own opinions, or the decisions of sister
circuits, in determining what law the Supreme Court has clearly established? The Sixth
1 White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1707.
19 See Woodall, 537 U.S. at 835.
20 Three dissenting justices in another recent case, in which the Sixth Circuit had granted habeas on the ground
that the defendant prisoner was "in custody" when he was taken to a prison conference room, noted the stark
difference between direct review and review of a decision on federal habeas:
Given this Court's controlling decisions on what counts as "custody" for Miranda
purposes, I agree that the law is not "clearly established" in respondent Fields's favor. See,
e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 105, 106 (2010); Thompsonv. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
112 (1995). But I disagree with the Court's further determination that Fields was not in
custody under Miranda. Were the case here on direct review, I would vote to hold that
Miranda precludes the State's introduction of Fields's confession as evidence against him.
Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1185-87, 1194 (2012) (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
21 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
22 Id. at 407.
23 White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1705-06.
24
Id. at 1706-07 (quoting Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
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Circuit in Woodall referred to a prior case in which the court had analyzed the Supreme
Court's cases involving an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to testify, noting
that although the high court had not "directly" addressed the specific circumstance at
issue, the principles set forth in its opinions suggested that the instruction requested was
constitutionally required.2 5 In fact, in the circuit court's view, the question the Supreme
Court had not "directly" addressed was application of the principle to non-capital cases;26
given Woodall's death sentence, that concern was irrelevant. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court chastised the circuit for basing its conclusion on one of its own cases, broadly
proclaiming that a lower court may not "consult" its own precedents in assessing a habeas
claim governed by § 2254.27
A number of the per curiam opinions that are the subject of this essay, in which
the Court has reversed circuit courts' grant of habeas relief summarily, without briefing or
oral argument, assert that habeas was not warranted because the applicable law had not
been "clearly established" - there simply was no explicit prior holding by the Supreme
Court on the facts presented. Of course, as any law student knows after a few weeks in
school, the "holding" of a case can be stated in rather general or very specific terms. In the
extreme case, so many facts are incorporated in the holding that virtually any deviation
from those particular facts prevents the case from being binding precedent.28 That appears
to be the route taken by the Supreme Court in the habeas context when determining that
the law based on which relief was granted was not in fact "clearly established." Reliance
on general principles of constitutional law drawn from Supreme Court precedents, or,
even worse, on interpretation of those precedents by the circuits themselves, is condemned
as departing from the highly deferential standard of review required by AEDPA.
In eight of the summary reversals in recent terms, three involving death sentences
and three sentences of life imprisonment, the per curiam opinions focused primarily on the
lack of clearly established law to support the grant of habeas relief. In its brief opinion
25 Id. at 1703. In the prior case, Finney v. Rothgerber, the court had analyzed the issue as follows:
In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981),
the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the right, upon
request, to a jury instruction that his failure to testify may not be the basis of an inference
of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way. The Court had earlier held that a federal
statute required that a no adverse inference instruction be given upon request of a criminal
defendant. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 84 L. Ed. 257, 60 S. Ct. 198 (1939).
Following Carter, in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 101 S. Ct. 1866
(1981), the Court held a defendant is entitled to the Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination in the punishment phase of a bifurcated trial of a capital case, declaring,
"We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phase of
respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
is concerned." Id. at 462-63 (footnoted omitted).
The Supreme Court has not held directly that a no adverse inference instruction
is required in the enhancement phase of a bifurcated persistent felony offender proceeding.
It can be argued that Estelle v. Smith should be applied only to the punishment phase of
capital cases, in view of the emphasis the Court placed on that feature of the case: "Given
the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the
obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees." 451 U.S. at 463 (citations
omitted). We do not believe this emphasis is significant.
751 F.2d 858, 863 (6th Cir. 1985).
2 6
Finney, 751 F.2d at 863.
27 White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 n.2.
28 Judges working within the common law tradition of stare decisis are well versed in how to characterize prior
cases from which they want to deviate. A common formulation is to describe the pesky precedent as "best
understood in the context of its facts." See Ursula Bentele, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, The Eighth Amendment, and
The Role of Precedent, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 267, 290 (1991). Rehnquist was referring to Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), which had announced a strict rule about when jurors could be excluded from
capital trials based on their death penalty views. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418 (1985).
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reversing the grant of relief to a petitioner serving life imprisonment for rape, the Court
reiterated three separate times that "no prior decision of this Court" clearly established the
principle on which the Ninth Circuit had relied.2 9 At issue was the Nevada trial court's
refusal to allow the defense to introduce evidence that the victim, defendant's former
girlfriend, had made several previous reports claiming that defendant raped or assaulted
her, claims the police were unable to corroborate, thereby depriving him of his federal
constitutional right to present a complete defense.3 0 According to the Supreme Court, the
circuit court had made the mistake of describing its precedents establishing the right to
present a defense too generally: "By framing our precedents at such a high level of
generality, a lower federal court could transform even the most imaginative extension of
existing case law into 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court.' 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)."31
The Nevada courts had asserted that the defendant could not rely on a Nevada
statute that explicitly granted defendants in sexual abuse cases the right to present
extrinsic evidence of false allegations because he had not filed the written notice required
by the statute. The Supreme Court declared: "No decision of this Court clearly establishes
that this notice requirement is unconstitutional."32 In response to the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that such a notice requirement is subject to examination as to whether it serves
legitimate state interests, the Court proclaimed: "Nor ... do our cases clearly establish that
the Constitution requires a case-by-case balancing of interests before such a rule can be
enforced."3 3 The Court concluded: "No decision of this Court clearly establishes that the
exclusion of such evidence for such reasons in a particular case violates the
Constitution."3 4 Of course, if that kind of specificity regarding the holding of precedents is
required, habeas petitioners will virtually never be entitled to relief.
Similarly confining habeas relief to cases in which the Supreme Court had faced
essentially identical facts, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
35prosecutor's closing argument in a capital case deprived the defendant of due process.
Conceding that part of the summation did appear improperly to allege collusion between
the defendant and counsel, the Court was not persuaded that his suggestion that the
defendant tailored his testimony justified the grant of relief: "The Sixth Circuit cited no
precedent of this Court in support of its conclusion that due process prohibits a prosecutor
from emphasizing a criminal defendant's motive to exaggerate exculpatory facts." 3 6
Again, habeas relief seems to be authorized only when the Supreme Court has decided a
case on all fours with the petitioner's.
In addition to granting relief without the requisite Supreme Court precedent, the
Sixth Circuit also committed error in consulting its own precedents, rather than those of
the Supreme Court.3 7 Rejecting the argument that the circuit court was simply considering
those cases to shed light on what law had been clearly established by the Supreme Court,
the Court noted that the general standard regarding prosecutorial misconduct set forth in
29 Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1991, 1993-94 (2013) (per curiam).
30
Id at 1990-91.
31 Id. at 1994.
32
Id. at 1993.
3 Id The Court described the decision on which the Ninth Circuit relied, Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145
(1991), as "very far afield." Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1993. Again, any intelligent second-semester law student
could make a cogent argument to the contrary.
34 Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1994.
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its key precedent, Darden v. Wainwright,38 did not support the more specific tests
suggested by the circuit court cases cited.39 Accordingly, the Court granted the warden's
petition for writ of certiorari and reversed the circuit court's decision granting habeas
relief.40
A third summary reversal illustrates the same pattern. At the first trial of Irving
Cross, the complaining witness had described a forcible assault, while the defendant
claimed a consensual sexual encounter in exchange for money and drugs.4 1 The jury found
the defendant not guilty of kidnapping, but when it was unable to reach a verdict on the
sexual assault count, the court declared a mistrial.42 At the retrial, the complainant could
not be located and, over defense objection, her prior testimony was read by a legal intern
from the State's attorney's office upon a finding that the prosecution had made sufficient
efforts to secure her presence.43 The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault, but
found him guilty of criminal sexual assault, and the Illinois appellate courts affirmed.44
The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief (reversing the district court), on the basis that
the Illinois courts were unreasonable in finding the State's efforts to secure the
complainant's testimony to be sufficient.45 In finding that the efforts did not meet
constitutional standards, given the importance of the witness's testimony, the court relied
in part on the fact that the trial judge had described the witness's testimony at the first trial
as halting, while the intern read the testimony without the pauses.46 Regarding her
unavailability, in addition to suggesting various avenues the State might have pursued to
find the witness, the court noted that the prosecution failed to serve her with a subpoena
after she had expressed concern about testifying at the retrial. The Supreme Court
responded to that assertion as follows: "We have never held that the prosecution must
have issued a subpoena if it wishes to prove that a witness who goes into hiding is
unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes . . . ."4 If that kind of specificity is
required in the prior holdings of Supreme Court cases, habeas relief will indeed be limited
to cases that duplicate the facts in those precedents.
Two other summary reversals in which circuit courts had granted relief to death
row inmates also relied on the absence of "clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court." The Sixth Circuit had found a Fifth Amendment violation when
the police persuaded the defendant to cut a deal before his accomplice did so. The
Supreme Court responded: "Because no holding of this Court suggests, much less clearly
establishes, that police may not urge a suspect to confess before another suspect does so,
the Sixth Circuit had no authority to issue the writ on this ground." 48 Articulating a
similarly narrow description of what previous high court precedents must hold, the Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit's grant of relief on a Batson claim:
38477 U.S. 168, 189-90 (1986).
3 Parkerv. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. at 2155.
40 Id. at 2156. The case was remanded for further proceedings, but as of this writing, no additional decision has
been forthcoming.
4 1 




44 Id. at 493.45
id.
46 Id. at 491, 493. See Cross v. Hardy, 632 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2011) ("A.S.'s testimony at the first trial was
pause-filled and evasive, which may have adversely affected the jury's impression of her, as is perhaps
demonstrated by the verdict of not guilty on the kidnapping count and the lack of a verdict on the sexual assault
counts.").
47 Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. at 494.
48 Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 30 (2011).
40 [Vol. 5
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In holding that respondent is entitled to a new trial, the Court of
Appeals cited two decisions of this Court, Batson and Snyder, but
neither of these cases held that a demeanor-based explanation for a
peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally
observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror's
demeanor.49
Again, requiring such a fact-specific holding in a Supreme Court case before habeas relief
is warranted limits state prisoners to swiss-cheese-like constitutional protections with
major holes wherever the Court has not yet confronted the fact pattern presented by the
petitioner.
Finally, the pattern continues in the current term. On the first day, the Court
summarily reversed, in a per curiam opinion, the grant of habeas to a defendant convicted
of murdering his wife when the prosecution asserted throughout the trial that he had
committed the killing himself, but after all the evidence was in, requested an aiding and
abetting charge.5 0 The jury, instructed on both theories, found the defendant guilty without
specifying which theory it found to have been proven. The Court justified its reversal both
on the ground that the California courts' affirmance of the conviction did not contravene
clearly established Supreme Court law and that the circuit court had committed error in
relying on its own precedents.
On the issue of how "clearly" the law must be established, the Court defined the
principle at issue in the narrowest possible terms:
[T]he Ninth Circuit's grant of habeas relief may be affirmed only if this
Court's cases clearly establish that a defendant, once adequately
apprised of such a possibility, can nevertheless be deprived of adequate
notice by a prosecutorial decision to focus on another theory of liability
at trial. The Ninth Circuit pointed to no case of ours holding as much.
Instead, the Court of Appeals cited three older cases that stand for
nothing more than the general proposition that a defendant must have
adequate notice of the charges against him. This proposition is far too
abstract to establish clearly the specific rule respondent needs. We have
before cautioned the lower courts - and the Ninth Circuit in particular -
against "framing our precedents at such a high level of generality."
Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U. S. __, _ (2013) (per curiam) (slip op., at
7). None of our decisions that the Ninth Circuit cited addresses, even
52remotely, the specific question presented by this case.
As in the cases discussed above, the Court seems to require a precedent with a fact pattern
virtually on all fours to warrant federal habeas relief.
Similarly, the Court found fault with the circuit's citation to its own precedent,
refusing to accept the lower court's assertion that the previous case had simply applied
principles that had been established by the Supreme Court:
49 Thalerv. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010).
5o Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 5-6 (2014), rev'gper curiam 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013).
' Id. at 1-2.
52 Id. at 3-4 (citation omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit did not purport to identify any case in which we have
found notice constitutionally inadequate because, although the defendant
was initially adequately apprised of the offense against him, the
prosecutor focused at trial on one potential theory of liability at the
expense of another. Rather, it found the instant case to be
"indistinguishable from" the Ninth Circuit's own decision in Sheppard
v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234 (1989), which the court thought "faithfully
applied the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court." 53
Apparently disagreeing with the circuit court's assessment that it was in fact
applying clearly established Supreme Court law, the Court summarily reversed the
decision granting habeas relief.
Another recent case, again from the Ninth Circuit, continued in the same vein.
Habeas relief had been denied by the district court and a panel of the circuit, but the en
banc court reversed in a decision that was, in turn, reversed summarily by the Supreme
Court.54 At trial, the defendant, charged with participating in robberies with two
associates, had relied on a defense of duress. Before summation, his attorney asked to be
able to argue both that the state had not proven that his client was an accomplice and, in
the alternative, that he had acted under duress. The trial court ruled that, under state law, a
defendant was prohibited from simultaneously contesting an element of the crime and
raising an affirmative defense.5 The state appellate court agreed that the trial court's
decision was in error, but ruled the error harmless. On federal habeas, the en banc court
deemed the mistake to constitute structural error, the kind of error that is not subject to
harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court declared this ruling not to have been clearly
established, noting that most constitutional errors call for reversal only if the government
fails to show harmlessness, with only a rare type of error requiring automatic reversal:
"None of our cases clearly requires placing improper restriction of closing argument in
this narrow category."56
In addition to interpreting the relevant Supreme Court precedent too broadly, the
circuit had also cited to precedents from its own circuit. Again declining to accept that the
court referred to these decisions simply to shed light on what law had been clearly
established by the Supreme Court,7 the Court reminded the circuit that, as "we have
repeatedly emphasized," circuit court precedent does not satisfy AEDPA's clearly
established law requirement.
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit was the subject of the Court's tongue-lashing for
its grant of habeas relief to a Michigan defendant serving a life sentence.5 9 During the
trial, the defendant's attorney was absent from the courtroom when testimony was given
by a prosecution witness concerning telephone calls among the codefendants.6 0 Chiding
the lower court for finding counsel's absence during a critical stage to amount to a Sixth
Amendment violation under United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court noted that "We
have never addressed whether the rule announced in Cronic applies to testimony regarding
5 
Id. at 3.54 
See Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430-31 (2014), revg Frost v. Van Boening, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 430.
6
Id. at 430-3 1.
Id. at 431. The Court seemed to find it determinative that the precedents did not arise under AEDPA; it did not
explain why that fact should be conclusive on the issue of what law the Supreme Court had "clearly established".
Id. at. 431-32.
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codefendants' actions."6 1 Reprising its theme that to be "contrary to" Supreme Court law,
one of its own precedents must have confronted the specific question presented, the Court
saw no case in which testimony relevant to a codefendant was deemed to amount to a
critical stage of the proceeding.62
These per curiam, summary decisions by the Supreme Court send a strong
63message to lower federal courts considering granting habeas relief to a state prisoner.
That message is obviously most explicit when the Court directly orders habeas relief to be
denied.6 4 In most cases, however, the Court remands to the circuit court for further
65proceedings consistent with the per curiam opinion. Such remands generally, but not
always, result in denial of habeas relief.66 In addition, the Court with some frequency
issues orders granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding (gvr) for reconsideration in light
67of decisions that have some bearing on the opinion below. In those cases, too, the lower
courts most often "get the hint" and issue an opinion in keeping with the Court's
restrictive view of the availability of habeas relief under AEDPA.68 Finally, even without
an order from the Court, some circuits, presumably gleaning an implicit threat of summary
reversal, have sua sponte changed outcomes in cases previously granting relief, citing to
recent Supreme Court opinions.69 The pronounced ripple effect of the Court's admonition
that circuit courts are prohibited from playing any role in developing principles of
constitutional law in the context of assessing state court decisions under AEDPA means
that state prisoners throughout the country must be satisfied with Constitution lite.
"6 Id. at 1377.
62 Id.
63 To further complicate matters, the message may be strong, but not entirely clear. As one scholar has pointed
out, use of the summary reversal has the potential of muddying up "clearly established law." See Richard M. Re,
Did the Martinez Sum Rev Apply or Change the Law?, RE'S JUDICATA (June 6, 2014),
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/did-the-martinez-sum-rev-apply-or-change-the-law/.
64 Indeed, in one recent case, the Court at first stated that habeas relief should be denied despite an open issue on
which the circuit had not yet ruled. See Johnsonv. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1092 (2013). Then, alerted by two
circuit judges pointing out the error, the Court issued a per curiam decision remanding for consideration of that
claim under the proper standard. See Johnson v. Williams, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), vacating 720 F.3d 1212 (9th
Cir. 2013). Judges Reinhardt and Kozinski concurred in denial of the habeas petition but expressed concern
about the Court's previous opinion. See 720 F.3d at 1212, 1214.
6' See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) ("The petition for a writ of certiorari and
respondent's motion to proceed in fonna pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
6 See discussion infra notes 81-96.
67 See, for example, two cases remanded for reconsideration in light of White v. Woodall: Washington v. Sec'y
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 726 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. Wetzelv. Washington, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014)
(granting habeas for confrontation clause violation when codefendant's confession implicated the defendant);
Drummond v. Houk, 728 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2013) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Robinson v.
Drummond, 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014) (granting habeas for violation of right to a public trial by closure of the
courtroom without demonstration of an overriding interest). According to one observer, some remands are not
easily explained. See James J. Duane, Sherlock Holmes and the Mystery of the Pointless Remand, 18 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 154, 169-70 (2013).
68 See, e.g., infra note 114.
69 See, e.g., Moore v. Helling, 763 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). The original opinion granting habeas was
withdrawn (Warden had petitioned for rehearing) in light of the intervening decision in White v. Wfoodall, which
made clear that relief may not be based on a state court's unreasonable refusal to extend a rule set forth by
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1015. The court explained that when petitioner's conviction became final,
fairminded jurists could conclude that the Supreme Court had not yet clearly established that an ameliorative
change in state law must be applied retroactively to cases pending on appeal. Id. at 1020. See also Rivera v.
Cuomo, 664 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2011) (panel decision granting habeas on ground of insufficiency of the evidence
reversed on rehearing based on summary reversal in Cavazos v. Smith, which reasserted the "double deference"
due to state court decisions raising such a claim).
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III. No FAIRMINDED JURIST
The Supreme Court's insistence that, before any federal court, including the
Court itself, is authorized to grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the law governing the
claim must have been clearly established by the high court in the factual context in which
the petitioner presents it poses a significant constraint. That limitation has been magnified
exponentially by the Court's recent redefinition of the meaning of the term "unreasonable
application." In cases where the state court adjudicated the federal constitutional claim on
the merits, comprising the vast majority of federal habeas petitions,70 the federal court is
precluded from granting the writ unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .,,71 Particularly given that even so-called
postcard denials of relief, that is those in which the state court provides no reasons
whatever, are deemed to be on the merits,72 it is not surprising that state decisions will
rarely be challengeable as "contrary to" clearly established law. Most cases, therefore, will
fall under the "unreasonable application" clause.
That clause was first interpreted in Williams v. Taylor,73 where, with Justice
O'Connor writing the controlling opinion, the Court emphasized that the petitioner must
show something more than that the state court's decision was erroneous; rather, the
decision must have been "objectively unreasonable."7 The Court firmly rejected,
however, the position taken by some circuits that, to be unreasonable, the challenged state
court decision had to be one that no reasonable jurist could make.5 Yet eleven years later,
in Harrington v. Richter,76 without so much as acknowledging its about-face, the Court
adopted just that interpretation. State prisoners whose claims were adjudicated on the
merits by state courts are now barred from federal relief unless there is "no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's
precedents."7 " A number of the summary per curiam opinions have explicitly relied on this
standard in reversing the circuit courts' grants of habeas relief, at times placing an
additional gloss on the meaning of "unreasonable application." Quoting the Richter
standard in the first paragraph of its opinion reinstating a death sentence, for example, the
Court asserted: "Because it is not clear that the Ohio Supreme Court erred at all, much less
70 The most common scenario where a state court does not reach the merits involves reliance on the defendant's
failure to follow a state procedural rule, thereby defaulting the claim. Under such circumstances, the habeas
petitioner is not entitled to federal review at all without demonstrating either "cause and prejudice" or actual
innocence. Fortunate petitioners who can overcome that high bar may then be granted de novo review. See cases
cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West 1996).
72 See Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011).
7 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
74 Id. at 409.
75
id.
7 562 U.S. 86.
7 Justice Kennedy's opinion cites to Wiliams only generally as distinguishing between an unreasonable
application and an incorrect application. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 100-01. Without explanation, the
opinion goes on to assert that federal habeas relief is precluded so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on
the correctness of the state court's decision. Id. at 88 (citing Yarboroughv. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
In that 5 to 4 decision, again without any reference to the discussion in Wl/ams, the majority introduced the idea
of the fairminded jurist as the appropriate standard for determining whether a state court decision was
unreasonable. Yarborough, 541 U.S. 663-64. Scholarship supporting the Court's restrictive interpretation of
AEDPA similarly ignores the initial interpretation of the AEDPA language in tillams v. Taylor. See, e.g.,
O'Scannlain, supra note 8; see also O'Brien, supra note 8. Neither article so much as mentions the opinion in
Williams v. Taylor.
7' Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
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erred so transparently that no fairminded jurist could agree with that court's decision, the
Sixth Circuit's judgment must be reversed."7 9 The notion that an error must be
"transparent" appears to be a new, and exacting, requirement.
Application of the "no fairminded jurist" standard has led to some puzzling
results. In two cases in which the Supreme Court had summarily reversed the grant of
habeas but sent the case back to the circuit for further consideration, habeas relief was
again affirmed, each time over the dissent of a member of the panel. Despite what
appeared to be the opinion of a presumptively fairminded judge, the Supreme Court this
time denied certiorari review to the wardens. Examination of these opinions reveals the
extent to which the writ has been both marginalized and made dependent on the subjective
views of the particular judges who happen to sit on the panel reviewing the case. These
results are particularly ironic given that the standard was originally touted as suggesting
that relief would be based on "objective" unreasonableness.
In one of the cases in which the Supreme Court summarily reversed the grant of
habeas to a death row inmate by the Third Circuit, the Court remanded for exploration of
an issue on which the state court might have relied.o According to the Court, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have concluded, when denying petitioner's Brady
claim, that a report that had been withheld was "ambiguous." Having been chided for
failing to acknowledge and address the state courts' possible reliance on the ambiguous
nature of the withheld report, the Third Circuit on remand explicitly addressed that
purported conclusion.1 Even granting AEDPA deference, the majority found the state
court's characterization of the police report as ambiguous to be an unreasonable
determination of the facts, as well as an unreasonable application of clearly established
law.8 2 Accordingly, this Pennsylvania death row inmate's life was spared.
Dissenting Judge Hardiman, on the other hand, conceding that finding ambiguity
was not the most natural reading of the report, asserted that the state court's decision had
enough support to preclude federal habeas relief: "If we exercised de novo review of the
state court decision, it would seem that the best reading of the activity sheet is that it
relates to the . .. robbery [with which petitioner was charged]. But under AEDPA's highly
deferential standard of review, 'even a strong case for relief does not mean the state
court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable. '83 The dissenting judge further cited to the
earlier Supreme Court case of Yarborough v. Alvarado84 for the proposition that habeas
relief is precluded as long as the state court decision was "within the matrix" of the
custody test for Miranda purposes as articulated by the Court. 5 Finally, the judge stressed
the reach of the standard set forth in Harrington v. Richter, supplying emphasis to the
word "possibility": "The Court has repeatedly reminded the lower federal courts that
AEDPA precludes relief unless the state court's ruling was error 'beyond any possibility
of fairminded disagreement. '86 In a footnote to this interpretation of the standard, Judge
Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011).
o Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012) ("[The] Third Circuit overlooked the determination of the
state courts that the notations were . . . 'entirely ambiguous."').
8 See Lambert v. Beard, 537 F. App'x. 78, 84-86 (3d Cir. 2013).
82 Id at 84.
83 Id at 89 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (quoting Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. at 88).
84 Id (quoting Yarboroughv. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004)).
Id (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 103).
8 Id (quoting Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added).
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Hardiman cited to a previous dissent in which he had collected all the cases in which the
Supreme Court had reversed lower courts for failure to heed this admonition.7
Another case illustrates the same point. Habeas relief that had been granted by
the Sixth Circuit was vacated and remanded"" in light of Parker v. Matthews," one of the
summary reversals being considered here. Unlike in most cases, when such a remand
results in the court toeing the line articulated by the Supreme Court, the lower court again
found relief warranted, with one judge dissenting.90 The circuit court acknowledged that
its first decision had relied, improperly as the Supreme Court made clear in Parker v.
Matthews, on its own precedent in evaluating the prejudice suffered by the defendant by
his attorney's deficient performance.91 On remand, the court reexamined the case using
only the Strickland standard itself and concluded that the Michigan court both failed to
apply the correct rule and, even if it stated the rule correctly, the result was an
unreasonable application of federal law.9 2 By contrast, the dissenting judge did not find
the Michigan court's decision to be "objectively unreasonable; fairminded jurists could
(and did) disagree on this point." 9 3
The same pattern is reflected in another recent case, in which the Supreme Court
has recently allowed the Eleventh Circuit's grant of habeas relief to vacate an Alabama
death sentence to stand.9 4 Here, too, a dissenting judge, praised by one of the judges ruling
in the petitioner's favor as a "nationally known and admired judge,"95 criticizes his
colleagues as failing to heed the requirement that the state court's application of Strickland
be "objectively unreasonable."96 It is difficult to square the disagreement of a jurist
acknowledged to be fairminded with the grant of habeas relief applying the "fairminded
jurist" standard.
The new fairminded jurist standard poses a particular analytical challenge in the
context of claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Such claims
require a defendant to demonstrate that "no rational trier of fact" could have agreed with
the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.97 To secure habeas relief on that
basis, in addition to making that showing, a petitioner must now show that a state court's
decision rejecting the sufficiency of the evidence claim was such that "no fairminded
jurist" could agree with it. As the Supreme Court noted in one of its per curiam summary
reversals, over the objection of three dissenting justices, "[b]ecause rational people can
sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will
sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must
8 Id. at n.2 (citing Garrus v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 694 F.3d 394, 412-15 nn.1-3 (3d Cir. 2012)). Judge
Raggi of the Second Circuit provided a similar list in an opinion dissenting from a grant of habeas relief. Young
v. Conway, 715. F.3d 79, 87 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (Raggi, J., dissenting).




90 Walkerv. Hoffner, 534 F. App'x. 406, 416-18 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1025 (2014).
9' Id. at 411 ("[A] defendant suffers prejudice when he is deprived of a 'substantial defense' by the deficient
performance of his counsel.") (citing Walkerv. McQuiggan, 656 F.3d at 321); see Parkerv. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.
2148, 2155 (2012).
92 Walkerv. Hoffner, 534 F. App'x at 412-13.
9Id at 418 (Cook, J., dissenting).
94 See DeBruce v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 758 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2014), cert denied sub nom Dunn v.
DeBruce, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4015 (June. 15, 2015).
9 Id at 1279-80 (Martin, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 1280 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97 Jacksonv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 319 (1979).
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nonetheless uphold."9 " Yet in this context, several presumably fairminded jurists
(including three justices of the Supreme Court) found the evidence so lacking that no
rational factfinder could arrive at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The case that prompted the Court's admonition that mistaken convictions must
sometimes be upheld involved Shirley Rhee Smith, a grandmother convicted of killing her
seven-week-old grandchild based on questionable evidence that he had died of "shaken
baby syndrome."99 The case had a long and complicated history in the state and federal
courts, including three trips to the United States Supreme Court. When the Ninth Circuit
first granted habeas relieft100 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of the
recently decided Carey v. Musladin, which, as described above, had narrowed the
meaning of "clearly established law" in § 2254(d)(1).o The Court of Appeals reinstated
its grant of relief on the grounds that, unlike the situation in Musladin, here, the federal
law had been clearly established by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia.102 The court
acknowledged that the high court had not confronted the same factual scenario presented
by the petitioner, but refused to accept that AEDPA could be interpreted to limit habeas
relief to cases in which the Court had decided an identical case.103 When the Warden
sought rehearing en banc in light of another Supreme Court case applying the Musladin
principle,104 the Ninth Circuit denied the petition, again finding that the intervening
opinion did not affect the grant of relief.10 5 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded,106
98 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam).
99 Id. at 4-5.
.00 Smithy. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We agree with Smith that no rational trier of fact could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith caused the child's death. We further conclude that the state
court's affirmance of Smith's conviction constituted an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), which established the standard for constitutional sufficiency
of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We accordingly reverse and remand with instructions to grant the
writ.").
101 Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74, 76 (2006). See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) (2014); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
102 Smithy. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2007).
103 The circuit court's decision stated as follows:
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court has never had a case where the issue was
whether the evidence, expert and otherwise, was constitutionally sufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had shaken an infant to death. But there are an
infinite number of potential factual scenarios in which the evidence may be insufficient to
meet constitutional standards. Each scenario theoretically could be construed artfully to
constitute a class of one. If there is to be any federal habeas review of constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence as required by Jackson, however, section 2254(d)(1) cannot be
interpreted to require a Supreme Court decision to be factually identical to the case in
issue before habeas can be granted on the ground of unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent.
Id. at 1259.
104 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008).
105 The court's decision stated:
For the same reason that we determined that Musladin did not affect our decision in Smith,
we conclude that Van Patten does not, either. Van Patten addresses an entire class of cases
under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence applying the standards set by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674(1984), for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Whether appearance of counsel by telephone is structural error is an
issue "for another day" that the Supreme Court may address to establish a rule for
innumerable cases in the future. See 128 S. Ct. at 747.
Smith v. Patrick, 519 F.3d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 2008).
10' Patrick v. Smith, 558 U.S. 1143 (2010).
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citing yet another intervening opinion, McDaniel v. Brown,107 in which it had granted
certiorari to consider the insufficiency standard in the habeas context. And yet again, the
Ninth Circuit reinstated its prior opinion.1os Finally, the Supreme Court summarily
reversed the grant of habeas relief, per curiam, over the dissents of three justices.109
The per curiam opinion begins by stressing that, under Jackson v. Virginia, it is
the responsibility of the jury, not the court, to decide what conclusions should be drawn
from evidence.1 o A reviewing court may set aside the jury verdict only if no rational trier
of fact could have agreed with the jury's assessment that the evidence demonstrated the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Added to this significant hurdle, on habeas
review, the federal court may not grant relief simply because it disagrees with the state
court's rejection of the sufficiency claim; rather, the state court decision must be
"objectively unreasonable" such that "no fairminded jurist" would agree with it."' It is
almost impossible even to imagine that no fairminded jurist could agree with a conclusion
of twelve jurors that the state court, by hypothesis, refused to reverse as one that "no
rational factfinder" would have reached.112
In another per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court also summarily reversed a
habeas grant on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, chiding the Third Circuit for
failing to afford the respect that the jury and Pennsylvania state courts were due.11 The
federal court had found insufficient evidence that the defendant was an accomplice of the
shooter to a deliberate murder; according to the Supreme Court, under the doubly
deferential standard, that conclusion could not stand. Accordingly, on remand habeas
relief was denied.114
Analysis of claims under these multiple layers of abstract standards, most
involving some notion of what is "reasonable," not only requires mind-numbing logical
gymnastics, but fails to achieve results that can in any meaningful way be termed
"objective." First, the Jackson standard itself suggests that presumably reasonable jurors
may arrive, unanimously, at a verdict that "no rational factfinder" could support. To
further complicate matters, that conclusion necessarily incorporates the constitutionally
mandated burden that guilt must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt."'15 Second, trial
courts routinely deny defense counsel's motion before the case is submitted to the jury
asking for dismissal on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. Overturning a jury's
verdict pursuant to the Jackson standard therefore inherently involves disagreement
among fairminded jurists. Accordingly, applying the "fairminded jurist" standard would
appear always to preclude the grant of federal habeas relief.
1o' Id. (citing McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010)).
.o. Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2010) ("We have now examined Brown along with
supplemental briefs from the parties addressing its potential effect on Smith's case. We conclude that nothing in
Brown is inconsistent with our prior decision or our method of reaching it. We accordingly reinstate our former
decision....").
109 Cavazosv. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 8 (2011).
110 Id. at 3-4.
.." Id. at 4; Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011) (per curiam).
112 Although she did not secure relief through the courts, Shirley Rhee Smith was ultimately granted a
commutation by Governor Jerry Brown. A.C. Thompson, California Governor Commutes Sentence in Shaken
Baby Case, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/califoria-governor-commutes-
sentence-in-shaken-baby-case.
113 Colemanv. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012).
114 Id. at 2064; Johnsonv. Mechling, 518 F. App'x. 106, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2013).
115 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
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The fairminded jurist standard raises a further issue for courts of appeals
considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability to a petitioner who has been
denied habeas relief by a district court. Long before Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme
Court had set the bar for issuance of such a certificate at a relatively low level. 1 16 Courts
were admonished that they should make only a threshold inquiry into the claim, assessing
whether the petitioner has made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right."1 17 Such a showing is made when "jurists of reason could disagree with the district
court's resolution" or conclude the issues presented are worthy of further exploration."" In
establishing this standard for appellate review, the Court noted specifically that "a claim
can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been
granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail."119
Once the fairminded jurist test is in place, however, if the issue is debatable among such
jurists, no habeas relief will ever be warranted for claims adjudicated on the merits in state
courts.
IV. SUMMARY TREATMENT
The Supreme Court's practice of issuing summary per curiam opinions resolving
cases on petitions for certiorari review has long come under strong criticism both within
the Court and from academics and practitioners. While the earlier practice of reversing
summarily without providing reasons1 20 has largely been abandoned, questions have been
raised about the lack of transparency and procedural regularity governing summary
dispositions.121 In addition, skeptics wonder whether such reversals are being limited to
cases of clear error, and whether there is a substantive bias in the selection of cases to
subject to this treatment.122 Moreover, concern that respondents may be unfairly
prejudiced when the merits of claims are adjudicated on petitions for writ of certiorari
continues to be voiced.
Several of the opinions being considered here illustrate the problems of such
summary reversals. In her dissent from the summary reversal in Cavazos v. Smith, joined
by two other members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg specifically chastised the Court for
its failure to allow for full briefing and argument.123 "The fact-intensive character of the
case calls for attentive review of the record, including a trial transcript that runs over 1,500
pages. Careful inspection of the record would be aided by the adversarial presentation that
full briefing and argument afford."1 24
". Indeed, in Cavazos v. Smith, the Magistrate Judge noted that this was not the typical shaken baby case, raising
many questions, but found that the evidence was sufficient to a support conviction. 132 S. Ct. at 6, 8. The district
court adopted this recommendation, but granted a COA on ground that question was debatable. Id
117 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2014)).
"1 Id
119 Id. at 338.
120 Failure to give any rationale for summary reversal prompted the initial protests against the practice. See, e.g.,
Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process ofLaw, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 82, 90 (1958).
121 See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LiBERTY 1 (2015).
Professor Baude looked at all the Roberts Court's summary reversals so far, and studied in depth those issued in
the 2013-14 term. He describes the reversals as falling into two general categories: those designed to enforce the




See Jonathan Kirshbaum, Accelerating Pace of Supreme Court's Summary Reversals of Habeas Relief
Suggests Impatience with Circuit Courts'Failure to Defer to State Tribunals, CRIM. L. REP., June 27, 2012, at 1-
3; see also Baude, supra note 121, at 4.
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Justice Ginsburg cited to two highly respected treatises in support of her
objection to the summary treatment of the case. The classic treatise on Supreme Court
practice1 2 5 characterizes per curiam opinions such as those discussed in this article, in
which the Court grants certiorari and, at the same time, disposes of the merits, addressing
both facts and issues in detail, as the "most controversial form of summary disposition."1 26
The authors note that the justices themselves characterized summary reversals as "rare and
exceptional," appropriate only when "law is well settled and stable, facts are not in
dispute, and the decision below is clearly wrong."1 27 According to Justice Brennan,
summary dispositions should be limited to situations where the decision below flatly
rejected the Court's controlling authority. If even one justice disagreed, the case should be
set for briefing and argument.128 In addition, the authors describe the problems posed for
counsel, particularly for respondents, by the use of summary reversals, in light of the fact
that lawyers are told not to focus on briefing the merits of the issue when seeking or
opposing certiorari review.1 29
Summary reversal seems particularly questionable when, as in Shirley Rhee
Smith's case and the capital case involving James Lambert described above,1 3 0 several
justices of the Supreme Court dissent from the disposition. If indeed the practice is meant
for cases in which the law and facts are undisputed and the decision below is clearly
wrong, even one dissenting opinion, much less three, would suggest that, at the very least,
full briefing and argument is in order. Moreover, the lack of any written dissent does not,
in and of itself, demonstrate that summary treatment is proper. Several of the unanimous
summary reversals presented both factual and legal issues that seemed worthy of full
consideration by the Court. In Felkner v. Jackson, for example, the Ninth Circuit had
granted relief on a Batson claim, finding that the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral bases
were not sufficient to counter evidence of purposeful discrimination, given that two of
three black jurors were stricken and the record reflected different treatment of comparably
situated white jurors. 13 1 Such claims are by their nature fact-sensitive, and adherence to
the prohibition against use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race has by no means
been universally accepted.13 2 Yet the Supreme Court summarily reversed the circuit
court's determination: "That decision is as inexplicable as it is unexplained. It is
reversed."1 33 Noting the deference due to the trial judge's assessment of a prosecutor's
credibility, to which AEDPA adds another level of deference, the Court announced: "The
state appellate court's decision was plainly not unreasonable. There was simply no basis
for the Ninth Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive
manner."l34
125 Id.; GRESSMAN, ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (10th ed. 2013) is "regarded as a sufficiently
authoritative resource on all things related to the Court that it is cited not only by lawyers who argue there but
also by the Justices themselves." Tom Goldstein and Amy Howe, Book review: New edition for a classic treatise,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 28, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/book-review-new-edition-for-a-
classic-treatise/.
126 GRESSMAN, ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 349 (9th ed. 2007).
127 Id. at 350-51 (quoting Justice Marshall). The other treatise cited by Justice Ginsburg, FALLON, ET. AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009), also cites to justices in its critique of summary
reversals, adding that some justices complained that they were more likely to be granted in favor of the
government than an individual claiming violation of constitutional rights. Id. at 1479-80.
128 Justice Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 232 (1983).
129 GRESSMAN, AT AL., supra note 126, at 417 n.46.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
131 562 U.S. 594, 597 (2011).
1
32
See, e.g., Miller-Ely. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003).
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The panel of the Ninth Circuit that did reach this conclusion surely will consider
the Supreme Court's summary reversal of its decision to have been reached in a similarly
"dismissive manner." As will the Sixth Circuit, whose decision that a defendant facing a
death sentence did not receive effective assistance at sentencing phase was summarily
reversed, with the conclusory statement: "Because we think it clear that Van Hook's
attorneys met the constitutional minimum of competence under the correct standard, we
grant the petition and reverse."3 5 The circuit court was deemed particularly at fault for
relying on the 2003 ABA guidelines for the defense of capital cases, a point that prompted
Justice Alito to write a separate concurrence to make clear that the opinion in no way
136suggests that those guidelines have special relevance1. Admonishing the circuit court for
relying on the well-established guidelines for the representation of defendants in capital
cases seems particularly unseemly without allowing full briefing or oral argument on the
issue.
V. TONE
As the previous sections have shown, these per curiam summary reversals reveal
a pattern of limiting the federal habeas petitioner's opportunity to secure relief based on
constitutional violations in state court. The petitioner must be able to point to "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," which
has been limited to narrowly defined holdings of the Court; no reference should be made
to any circuit court rulings; then it must be demonstrated that "no fairminded jurist" would
agree with the state court's determination that his constitutional rights were not violated.
Moreover, all this must be accomplished in the context of responding to a petition for
certiorari by the warden, without the opportunity for full briefing and argument. One
additional characteristic of these opinions is noteworthy: their tone. The Court strikes an
attitude of lecturing and dismissiveness, suggesting that the circuit courts need to be
taught a lesson, that they should know better. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, the
Court's summary reversals can be seen as a non-too-subtle threat to any federal court
considering granting habeas relief.137 Even if not designed to send such warnings, the
language used by the Court in describing opinions granting relief certainly conveys a
message any objective reader would find insulting.
The Supreme Court's attitude is well illustrated by the first paragraph of one of
the summary reversals in a case in which the defendant had been sentenced to death:
In this habeas case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder convictions based on the
flimsiest of rationales. The court's decision is a textbook example of
what the ... AEDPA proscribes: "using federal habeas corpus review as
a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts."
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. _ (2010) (slip op., at 12). We therefore grant
the petition for certiorari and reverse.138
The Supreme Court's derogatory assessment of the Sixth Circuit's opinion is particularly
striking in light of the Court's own curious evaluation of the evidence regarding extreme
emotional disturbance, the issue on which the circuit had found the Kentucky courts to
135 Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 5 (2009).
136 Id. at 13-14 (Alito, J., concurring).
137 See Kirshbaum, supra note 122, at 4.
138 Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2149 (2012) (emphasis added).
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have improperly shifted the burden to the defense. Noting that the defense expert admitted
that many people suffer from adjustment disorders, the Court commented: "But of course
very few people commit murders.l39 The Court thereby suggested that it is the murder for
which there must be a reasonable explanation or excuse, while any competent first year
criminal law student would understand that the requirement of a reasonable explanation
applies to the emotional disturbance, not to the killing.
In the same opinion, the Court chastised the circuit court for relying on its own
precedents, rather than limiting consideration to Supreme Court case law. Beginning with
a phrase that appears regularly in these summary reversals:
To make matters worse, the Sixth Circuit decided [the prior case] under
pre-AEDPA law, . . . so that case did not even purport to reflect clearly
established law as set out in this Court's holdings. It was plain and
repetitive error for the Sixth Circuit to rely on its own precedents in
granting Matthews habeas relief.14 0
Why reliance on a pre-AEDPA case would "make matters worse" is by no means clear;
surely a circuit court could render an opinion stating well-established principles of
constitutional law rooted in Supreme Court precedents at any time.14 1
The Court's reversal of habeas relief granted to a death row inmate by the Sixth
Circuit contained similarly querulous language: "Because it is not clear that the Ohio
Supreme Court erred at all, much less erred so transparently that no fairminded jurist
could agree with that court's decision, the Sixth Circuit's judgment must be reversed."1 42
Regarding the circuit court's rationale for concluding that the state courts had failed to
acknowledge a Miranda violation, the Court announced dismissively: "That is plainly
wrong."l43
The Court used the same phraseology in rejecting the Ninth Circuit's evaluation
of the evidence in Shirley Rhee Smith's case as insufficient to demonstrate the cause of
the child's death beyond a reasonable doubt: "That conclusion was plainly wrong."1 44
Reminding the circuit that a state appellate court can reverse for insufficiency only if no
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime; that the
reviewing court must presume that jury resolved conflicts in favor of prosecution, and
must defer to that resolution; and that AEDPA adds another layer of deference to state
court decisions, the Court announced: "[T]here can be no doubt of the Ninth Circuit's
error below."l45 The Court continued with its tone of absolute certainty, despite the
disagreement of three dissenting justices: "In light of the evidence presented at trial, the
Ninth Circuit plainly erred in concluding that the jury's verdict was irrational, let alone
that it was unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to think otherwise."1 46 The




140 Id. at 2155-56.
141 See supra note 57 (describing another case in which the Court made the same point in reversing the Ninth
Circuit).
142 Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011), habeas denied, 737 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2013), reh g denied, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 1890 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 63 (2014).
143 Id. at 29.
144 Cavazosv. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 6 (2011).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 7.
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been mistaken and accused the court of essentially ignoring the Supreme Court's
directives:
The decision below cannot be allowed to stand. This Court vacated and
remanded this judgment twice before, calling the panel's attention to
this Court's opinions highlighting the necessity of deference to state
courts in §2254(d) habeas cases. Each time the panel persisted in its
course, reinstating its judgment without seriously confronting the
significance of the cases called to its attention. Its refusal to do so
necessitates this Court's action today.1 4 7
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting with two other justices, viewed the case as intensely fact-
bound and not worthy of certiorari review, and characterized the per curiam opinion as
follows: "[T]he Court is bent on rebuking the Ninth Circuit for what it conceives to be
defiance of our prior remands. I would not ignore Smith's plight and choose her case as a
fit opportunity to teach the Ninth Circuit a lesson."1 4 8
Criticizing the Ninth Circuit in another case, the Supreme Court, as noted
above,1 4 9 focused on the conclusory and dismissive manner in which the circuit treated the
state court's rejection of the petitioner's Batson claim: "The state appellate court's
decision was plainly not unreasonable. There was simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to
reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner."150 Yet some of
the per curiam opinions in which the high court rejected the determinations of circuit court
panels appear equally "dismissive," or at least might be taken that way by the judges who
had found violations of state prisoners' constitutional rights.
In summarily reversing the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas to a death row inmate
even in the absence of AEDPA deference, when the petitioner had filed for relief before
that statute was enacted, the Court, without the benefit of full briefing and argument, was
able to reject an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: "Because we think it clear that
Van Hook's attorneys met the constitutional minimum of competence under the correct
standard, we grant the petition and reverse."15 1 After describing the gruesome crime in
considerable detail, the Court noted that a panel of the circuit had been reversed by the en
banc court twice, and then went on to criticize the most recent panel opinion for its
reliance on the 2003 ABA guidelines for defense of capital cases, according to the Court,
"without even pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing professional
practice at the time of the trial."15 2 The Court continued: "To make matters worse," the
circuit treated the guidelines as inexorable commands, rather than as guides for what is
reasonable, as required by Strickland.153 To the petitioner's assertion that his counsel was
ineffective even under professional standards of the time, the Court responded curtly. "He
is wrong."l54
Justice Alito took the opportunity in his concurrence to stress that the Court's
opinion in no way suggests that ABA guidelines have special relevance.
147 Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
149 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
15o Felknerv. Jackson, 562 U.S. at 598.
.Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 4-5 (2009).
152 id. at 8.
153 id.
154 Id. at 9.
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It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work
that a defense attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the
obligations imposed by the Constitution, and I see no reason why the
ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged position in making that
determination.15 5
Particularly when a defendant's life is at stake, one might question whether it is
appropriate for the Supreme Court to reach out to scold a court of appeals for relying on
well-respected guidelines for the defense of capital cases without even permitting counsel
to brief and argue their possible relevance.
One of the Court's summary reversals of the current term contains the same kind
of sharp rebuke. Asserting that the "second rationale for the Court of Appeals' decision is
no more sound than the first," the Court summarizes the key points in the circuit court's
opinion leading it to the determination that the trial court's error was structural.156 The
next paragraph begins with a single word: "No."s15 The Court then goes on to find fault
with each aspect of the circuit's analysis, stressing that "reasonable minds could disagree"
with all of the lower court's conclusions.15 8
VI. SUMMARY REVERSALS WHEN RELIEF WAS DENIED
The five per curiam summary reversals of decisions in which the circuit court had
denied federal habeas corpus relief during this period159 convey strikingly different
characteristics, both in terms of substance and tone. Four of these cases are essentially
reversals based on procedural irregularities, in which the courts had in some way
misinterpreted their task in assessing the petitioner's right to relief.1 6 0 The fifth case,
Porter v. McCollum,1 6 1 was unanimous in reversing a death sentence imposed on a Korean
War veteran on the basis that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance at the
penalty phase of trial by not informing the jury about the defendant's post-traumatic stress
disorder. 162 As Linda Greenhouse pointed out at the time, the case formed a stark contrast
with that of Bobby Van Hook, whose lawyer similarly failed to present extensive
155 Id. at 14 (Alito, J., concurring).
.. Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014).
... Id. at 431.
158 Id.
159 See cases listed in Appendix B.
'6, In the most recent such case, Tiliams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), the Court corrected an error in its
previous opinion when it declared that the petitioner was not entitled to relief despite the fact that it had not ruled
on the merits of one of the issues. See supra note 64.
In Jefferson v. Upton, the Court remanded to the circuit for consideration of all the applicable exceptions to the
requirement that a federal court must accept state factual findings when the circuit had considered only one of
those exceptions. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 560 U.S. 284, 294-95 (2010). In Wellons v. Hall, the
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's denial of habeas relief to a petitioner under sentence of death because the
circuit had erroneously relied on a procedural bar that may have affected its decision to deny an evidentiary
hearing. 558 U.S. 220, 226 (2010). Fourjustices dissented on the ground that the circuit had also denied relief on
the merits, making remand inappropriate. Id. at 226-28 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 228-32 (Alito,
J., and Roberts, C.J., dissenting). And in Corcoran v. Levenhagen, the Court remanded to the circuit which had
reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief on one bases without addressing other claims challenging the
petitioner's death sentence. 558 U.S. 1, 2-3 (2009). When the circuit later granted habeas relief, the Court again
reversed summarily, on the ground that the circuit had relied on a violation of state law, rather than denial of a
federal constitutional right. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 7 (2010). On remand, the district court denied the
writ. Corcoranv. Buss, No. 3:05-CV-389, 2013 WL 140378, at *17 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2013).
16 558 U.S. 30 (2009).
162 Id. at 30-31, 40.
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mitigating evidence on behalf of that veteran.16 Because the state court had not decided
whether counsel's performance was deficient, Porter's claim could be reviewed de novo
by the federal court, without the deference due under AEDPA. Bobby Van Hook was not
so fortunate: habeas relief granted to that petitioner was summarily reversed.164
VII. CONCLUSION
The picture that emerges from examination of these summary reversals is one of
a Supreme Court arrogating to itself, through its tiny direct review docket, guardianship of
the Constitution as it applies to defendants in state courts, leaving no role for the lower
federal courts. From this vantage point, the Court interprets constitutional protections in
the narrowest possible terms, using the mechanism of summary reversals to send
unmistakable messages to the circuit courts that granting relief based on generous reading
of Supreme Court precedents, much less on lower court characterizations of what those
precedents might have held, will be set aside without so much as a call for briefing or oral
argument. Moreover, to be deemed "generous," an opinion in a petitioner's favor simply
needs to be one with which any fairminded jurist could disagree. And the Supreme Court's
per curiam opinions are written in a way that signals utter lack of respect for both the
petitioners and the courts that found their constitutional claims to be valid. The Great
Writ's protections extend only to Constitution lite.
163 See Linda Greenhouse, Selective Empathy, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 3, 2009, 9:11 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/selective-empathy.
164 Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 13 (2009).
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APPENDIX A
Summary reversals ofgrants ofhabeas corpus relief October, 2009 to June, 2015
Nov. 9, 2009 Bobby v. Van Hook, No. 09-144 6th Cir. (death sentence)
558 U.S. 4 (2009)
Nov. 16, 2009 Wong v. Belmontes, No. 08-1263 9 th Cir. (death sentence)
558 U.S. 15 (2009)
Jan. 11, 2010 McDaniel v. Brown, No. 08-559 9th Cir.
558 U.S. 120 (2010)
Feb. 22, 2010 Thaler v. Haynes, No. 09-273 5th Cir. (death sentence)
559 U.S. 43 (2010)
Nov. 8, 2010 Wilsonv. Corcoran, No. 10-91 7th Cir. (death sentence)
562 U.S. 1 (2010)
Mar. 21, 2011 Felkner v. Jackson, No. 10-797 9 th Cir.
562 U.S. 594 (2011)
May 2, 2011 Bobby v. Mitts, No. 10-1000 6th Cir. (death sentence)
131 S. Ct. 1762 (2011)
Oct. 31, 2011 Cavazos v. Smith, No. 10-1115 9th Cir.
132 S. Ct. 2 (2011)
Nov. 7, 2011 Bobby v. Dixon, No. 10-1540 6th Cir.
132 S. Ct. 26 (2011)
Dec. 12, 2011 Hardy v. Cross, No. 11-74 7th Cir.
132 S. Ct. 490 (2011)
Feb. 21, 2012 Wetzelv. Lambert, No. 11-38 3d Cir. (death sentence)
132 S. Ct. 1195 (2012)
May 29, 2012 Colemanv. Johnson, No. 11-1053 3 rd Cir.
132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012)
June 11, 2012 Parker v. Matthews, No. 11-845 6th Cir. (death sentence)
132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012)
April 1, 2013 Marshallv. Rodgers, No. 12-382 9 th Cir.
133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013)
June 3, 2013 Nevada v. Jackson, No. 12-694 9th Cir.
133 S. Ct. 1990 (2013)
This case was briefed and scheduled for oral argument, but shortly before the argument date, it was removed
from the calendar without explanation.
24
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Lopez v. Smith No. 13-946 9 th Cir.
135 S. Ct. 1 (2014)
Glebe v. Frost No. 14-95 9 th Cir.
135 S. Ct. 429 (2014)
Woods v. Donald No. 14-618 6th Cir.
135 S. Ct. 1372 (2015)
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APPENDIX B
Summary reversals of denials of habeas corpus relief October, 2009 to June, 2015
Oct. 20, 2009 Corcoranv. Levenhagen, No. 08-10495 7th Cir. (death sentence)
558 U.S. 1 (2009)
Nov. 30, 2009 Porterv. McCollum, No. 08-10537 1 1 th Cir. (death sentence
558 U.S. 30 (2009)
Jan. 19, 2010 Wellons v. Hall, No. 09-5731 1 1 th Cir. (death sentence
558 U.S. 220 (2010)
May 24, 2010 Jeffersonv. Upton, No. 09-8852 1 1 th Cir. (death sentence
560 U.S. 284 (2010)
July 1, 2014 Johnson v. Williams, No. 13-9085 9 th Cir.
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